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The role of taxation in explaining international allocation of investment has been
a subject of immense theoretical and empirical scrutiny. Undoubtedly, several
factors a⁄ect the location decision of a multinational ￿rm. The tax system
of the potential host economy is one of these factors positioning this issue on
the intersection of several branches of economies: public ￿nance, international
economics and international business.
Earlier empirical studies based on aggregate ￿gures on foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) suggest that high taxes negatively impact the ￿ ow of FDI; de
Mooij and Ederveen (2003) and Hines (1999). Recent empirical works exploit
data at the ￿rm level to estimate the e⁄ects of taxes on the decision where to
allocate the a¢ liate of the multinational ￿rm. By relying on microeconomic
data, these studies can provide information on the impact of taxes on behav-
ioural responses of multinational ￿rms to international di⁄erences in taxation
and adequately account for di⁄erences across ￿rms and industries. However,
most existing empirical studies treat FDI modes as homogenous projects miss-
ing one crucial piece of information, namely, the distinction between Mergers
and Acquisitions (M&A) and Green￿eld investment projects (new ventures).1
In this study, we progress to account for the mode of investment in estimating
the e⁄ect of di⁄erences in international tax rates on the probability of choosing a
location for an a¢ liate of a multinational ￿rm. Speci￿cally, there are reasons to
expect that the location decision of Green￿eld investments is more sensitive to
di⁄erences in international tax rates than the location decision of M&A projects.
First, if the potential M&A project is located in a high tax country, a part of
taxes might be capitalised reducing the acquisition price. This capitalisation
e⁄ect is less pronounced in the case of a Green￿eld investment and suggests that
M&A investments should react less to high taxes than Green￿eld investments
do. Second, M&A decisions depend on the availability of appropriate targets.
In principle, the set of potential locations for establishing a new plant might
be larger than that of potential locations of target ￿rms to be acquired. This
may make the multinational ￿rm less constrained in optimising over the location
decision of the new venture.
In our econometric analysis, we employ detailed ￿rm-level data on German
outbound FDI covering about 3600 ￿rms in the period from 2005 to 2007. The
valuable feature of this dataset is that since 2005 the German investor has to
report whether a new FDI project is a Green￿eld or M&A project. This enables
us to directly identify the mode of investment at the entry. In our sample, 34
percent of ￿rms enter the host economy as a Green￿eld project. The US is the
largest receiver of new FDI entries with a share of about 11 percent of total
German new outbound FDI projects.
Our main ￿ndings are summarised as follows. First, if we do not distin-
guish between the modes of entry, high tax rates reduce the probability of the
location to be chosen by a German FDI investor for its new a¢ liate. This ￿nd-
1See Devereux (2007) for a survey.
2ing is in line with results by Devereux and Gri¢ th (1998) on the location of
US multinationals abroad. Our second ￿nding however reveals that Green￿eld
investments are signi￿cantly more elastic to international taxation than M&A
investments. According to our logit estimates and after controlling for ￿rm and
country-speci￿c characteristics, an increase in the statutory corporate income
tax rate of 10 percent reduces the probability of choosing a country to host a
Green￿eld investment by about 6.4 percent. The tax elasticity for M&A in-
vestments however, although negative, is signi￿cantly smaller and only about
3.6 percent. Our study is the ￿rst to document this empirical ￿nding using
outbound microeconomic data. The notable exception linked to our study is
Swenson (2001) who examines the composition of FDI within the US and re-
ports that Green￿eld activities are more deterred than M&A activities from
investing in high tax states.2 The idea that the impact of taxation may depend
on the modes of FDI traces back to Auerbach and Hassett (1991) who argue
that tax reforms can alter the incentive of investing in acquisition of old capital
versus investing in new capital. Becker and Fuest (2008) present a theoretical
model of tax competition in which an increase in the tax rate raises the number
of M&A investments and lowers the number of Green￿eld investments. Huizinga
and Voget (2009) examine the impacts of double taxation on the organisational
structure following cross-border M&A activities. They ￿nd that countries with
high levels of international double taxation are less inclined to host the new
parent ￿rm after the merger or acquisition has occurred.3
Recent contributions in the literature on the theory of international trade
predict that ￿rm and project-speci￿c characteristics play the major role in de-
termining the mode of entry. Nocke and Yeaple (2008) and Ra⁄ et al. (2009)
show that more productive ￿rms tend to enter the foreign market as a Green￿eld
rather than M&A investment. In line with this result, Andersson and Svensson
(1994) ￿nd that high technological skills and research and development intensity
favour Green￿eld operations. Neary (2007) introduces an oligopolistic market
structure in a general equilibrium framework and shows that ￿rms acquire their
high cost revivals. In Nocke and Yeaple (2007), ￿rms involve in M&A activities
to complement their abilities.
From a policy perspective, our ￿nding that high tax countries are less attrac-
tive particularly for Green￿eld investments suggests that high tax countries miss
the chance of collecting additional tax revenues mainly because new Green￿eld
projects are allocated to low tax countries. Furthermore, the di⁄erent impacts
of high tax rates on the composition of FDI is also of economic interest as Green-
￿eld investments and M&A can have di⁄erent implications on the host economy.
M&A activities involve a change in the pattern of ownership rights but to a less
extent involve international reallocation of capital or an increase in production
capacity or labour demand. Furthermore, the pattern of productivity spillovers
from multinational a¢ liates to domestic ￿rms through knowledge spillovers and
changing the competition structure of the host economy may di⁄er between
2Swenson (2001) ￿nds that high taxes have a positive but insigni￿cant e⁄ect on M&As.
3The in￿uence of taxes on the ownership of foreign a¢ liates has recently been emphasized
by Desai and Hines (2003) and Becker and Fuest (2010).
3M&A and Green￿eld projects; Balsvik and Haller (2007).
This study proceeds as follows. In section two, we present our empirical
approach and describe the German ￿rm-level FDI dataset. We report the main
results in section three, and present a robustness analysis in section four. Finally,
we conclude in section ￿ve.
2 Empirical methodology and data
2.1 Investigation approach
Our econometrical analysis is cross-sectional focusing on ￿rms at the entry and
is based on a rich literature on FDI location choice. The ￿rm selects the location
associated with the highest expected pro￿t.4 Pro￿t functions (￿i) associated
with each location i = 1;2;:::;n are:
￿i = (1 ￿ ￿i)[Ri ￿ Ci] ￿ I
j
i (￿i), (1)
where j denotes either a Green￿eld or a M&A investment. The variable ￿i is the
corporate tax rate in location i. Ri is revenue and Ci is the cost function which
can depend on several factors such as: output, cost of labour, agglomeration
and other external economies e⁄ects etc. The term I
j
i (￿i) captures the initial
cost of the FDI in the case of Green￿eld projects and the purchase price in the
case of M&A projects. The optimal levels of output can be derived by solving
the system of ￿rst order conditions. Optimal pro￿ts (￿￿
i) can be computed by
substituting the optimal levels of output in the corresponding pro￿t functions.
Ultimately, however, our focus here is on the e⁄ects of taxation on location
decisions of M&A versus Green￿eld investments.
High taxes in the host economy lower future cash ￿ ows of the cross-border
investment in the case of M&A as well as the case of Green￿eld projects. Hence,
high taxes deter both types of FDI. However, in the case of a M&A project the
acquisition price is a function of the tax rate. The value of a ￿rm is the present
value of the cash payo⁄s that the claim holders of the ￿rm receive; Healy and
Palepu (2007). Corporate taxation reduces the value of a ￿rm; Modigliani and
Miller (1963). Consequently, a high tax rate may reduce the ￿nal price paid by
the buyer for a potential ￿rm. Huizinga, Voget, and Wagner (2008) provide em-
pirical evidence on a capitalisation e⁄ect of taxes in takeover premiums. Hence,




@￿i < 0. This
capitalisation e⁄ect however is expected to be smaller in the case of a Green-
￿eld investment since many mobile capital goods might be purchased at world
prices. Thus, the capitalisation of taxes in the acquisition price suggests that
the impact of taxes on the location decision is mitigated in the case of M&A
investments as compared to the case of Green￿eld investments.
Empirically, we observe the binary latent variable:
4Since we observe a FDI decision, we focus on the decision where to invest rather than the
decision whether to stay home or go abroad. See Marksuen (2002) for a general equilibrium





k;i, i = 1;2;:::;n and l 6= i
0 otherwise
(2)
where the subscript k denotes ￿rms. The pro￿tability of location l depends
inter alia on the statutory corporate income tax rate in location l (￿l):
￿￿
k;l = ￿ + ￿￿l+￿(M&Ak ￿ ￿l)+￿xk;l + ￿k;l (3)
where ￿ is an intercept, ￿ and ￿ are the coe¢ cients of interest, ￿ is the
vector of coe¢ cients corresponding to the controls and ￿k;l is a residual. To
investigate whether or not the two modes of investment react di⁄erently to
taxes, we include the interaction term M&A*￿, where M&A is a dummy that
takes the value 1 if the investment takes the form of M&A and zero if the
investment is a Green￿eld project. The multiplication of the M&A dummy
and the tax rate is required to compute interaction e⁄ects.5 The vector xk;l is
a vector of alternative-speci￿c controls that includes country-speci￿c controls,
i.e. controls that vary across countries but not ￿rms, as well as ￿rm-country
controls that vary across countries but are ￿rm speci￿c. In some speci￿cations,
we also take into account industry-speci￿c e⁄ects.










This logit model is estimated by maximum likelihood. The tax variable ￿l is
central in our analysis and its impact is expected to be negative and larger in
absolute value for Green￿eld than M&A investments. The identi￿cation is based
on cross-sectional variation in tax rates. Data on taxes are taken from Mintz
and Weichenrieder (forthcoming). Table (1) displays the statutory corporate
income tax rates for the countries in our sample. In 2006 for example, it exhibits
a minimum rate of 12.5 percent in Ireland and a maximum rate of 40.7 percent
in Japan.
The vector xk;l includes several variables that are related to the probability
of locating an a¢ liate in a host economy. (1) The previous presence of a ￿rm
in location l is captured by the number of a¢ liates already operating in the
host economy (no: affiliates). The presence of a ￿rm in an economy may
increase the probability of selecting that economy again. (2) The total ￿xed
and intangible assets invested by the parent ￿rm in location l (total assets)
accounts for the size of the prior investment of the parent ￿rm in location l.
(3) The level of development of the host economy is captured by the GDP per
capita (gdp capita). (4) The market size of the host economy is captured by
5However, the dummy M&A per se without interaction is not included in the regression
because it does not vary across the alternatives available for a ￿rm. If for example the German
parent acquires a ￿rm in a country then the dummy M&A takes the value 1 and also the
variable y takes the value 1 for this country-￿rm observation. However, the M&A dummy
takes the value 1 also for all other country-year observations corresponding to this location
choice (for which the variable y takes the value zero).
5Table 1: Statutory corporate income tax rates, percent
Country 2005 2006 2007 Country 2005 2006 2007
Argentina 35 35 35 Malaysia 28 28 27
Australia 30 30 30 Malta 35 35 35
Austria 25 25 25 Mexico 30 29 28
Belgium 34 34 34 Morocco 35 35 35
Brazil 34 34 34 Netherlands 31.5 29.6 25.5
Bulgaria 15 15 10 New Zealand 33 33 33
Canada 34.4 34.2 34.1 Nigeria 30 30 30
Chile 17 17 17 Norway 28 28 28
China 33 33 33 Philippines 32 35 35
Colombia 35 35 34 Poland 19 19 19
Croatia 20.3 20.3 20 Portugal 27.5 27.5 25
Czech 26 24 24 Romania 16 16 16
Denmark 28 28 28 Russia 24 24 24
Egypt 20 20 20 Saudi Arabia na 20 20
Finland 26 26 26 Singapore 20 20 20
France 33.8 33.3 33.3 Slovakia 19 19 19
Greece 32 29 25 Slovenia 25 25 23
Hong Kong 17.5 17.5 17.5 South Africa 37.8 36.9 36.9
Hungary 16 16 16 Spain 35 35 32.5
India 36.6 33.7 34 Sweden 28 28 28
Indonesia 30 30 30 Switzerland 21.3 21.3 21.3
Ireland 12.5 12.5 12.5 Taiwan 25 25 25
Italy 37.3 37.3 37.3 Thailand 30 30 30
Japan 40.7 40.7 40.7 Turkey 30 30 20
Kenia 30 30 30 UK 30 30 30
Korea 27.5 27.5 27.4 Ukraine 25 25 25
Lithuania 15 15 15 USA 39 39 38.6
Luxembourg 30.4 29.6 29.6 Venezuela 34 34 34
its population (population). The level of development and market size both
are expected to have positive e⁄ects on the probability of entering. (5) The
local labour market condition is captured by the labour freedom component
of the Heritage index of economic freedom (labour freedom). This proxy is
computed based on four factors: minimum wages, rigidity of hours, di¢ culty
of ￿ring redundant employees and cost of ￿ring redundant employees.6 The
labour freedom index is expected to be positively related to the probability of
choosing a location l; the higher the ￿ exibility of the labour market the higher
the probability of entering the economy.7 (6) The distance between Germany
6See Miller and Holmes (2009) for detailed information on the Heritage index.
7Some studies incorporate the average wage as a proxy for the labour market situation.
However, in most studies this variable turned out to be insigni￿cant as for example in Devereux
and Gri¢ th (1998) and Head and Mayer (2004). Furthermore, unfortunately, data on average
6and the location of the FDI project (distance). The inclusion of this variable
is in the tradition of the gravity literature. It captuers transport (trade) costs
and may also capture investors￿information on market conditions in the host
economy. Distance is typically associated with a negative estimated coe¢ cient.
(7) The openness of the host economy to international trade is captured by
the ratio (importsl + exportsl)/gdpl (openness). This proxy may capture two
opposite aspects. For example, the tari⁄-jumping argument suggests that the
probability of entering a relatively closed economy is rather high in order to
get access to the market. At the same time, economies that are more open
to international trade may be more open to international investments. (8) The
quality of institution is captured by a corruption index (corruption). We employ
the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International. We rede￿ne
it such that a high value of this index indicates a high level of corruption.
Further, we include industry dummies in some speci￿cations. These dummies
account for di⁄erence across industries and potential industry-speci￿c economies
of scales considerations. All level variables are expressed in terms of natural
logarithm. In the robustness analysis, we examine the e⁄ects of the e⁄ective
tax rate and further country-speci￿c characteristics such as the R&D intensity
and the ratio of market capitalisation of listed ￿rms. The reader is referred to
the data appendix for a detailed description and the sources of the variables
that are used in our study.
2.2 Firm data and descriptive statistics
The German foreign trade and payments regulation obliges all German ￿rms
and individuals investing abroad and satisfying the reporting requirements to
report key information such as balance sheet items as well as economic sectors of
the parent ￿rm and its a¢ liates. In contrast to several ￿rm-level data sources,
a valuable feature of this dataset is the inclusion of the entire population of
FDI ￿rms rather than being exclusive to listed or ￿big￿￿rms. Since 2005, Ger-
man investors are required to report whether a new investment is a Green￿eld
or M&A project.8 This is a novel piece of information that enables us to di-
rectly identify the mode of entry and conduct our empirical investigation. We
exclude from our sample banks, ￿nancial and non-pro￿t institutions since such
institutions face special tax treatments.
The data cover the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. Figure (1) displays the
number of new entries in each year. In total, 2321 new cross-border M&A
projects and 1306 Green￿eld investments are reported. In 2005, Green￿eld
investments constitute about 35 percent of total new entries. A similar pattern
occurs in 2006 and 2007 with a share of 36 and 38 percent respectively.
wages are not available for many countries in our sample.
8The investor has to check in the reporting form one of four possible options of outbound
FDI: (1) new entry Green￿eld project, (2) new entry M&A project, (3) already existing ￿rm
(the same ￿rm has been reported in the last year), or (4) ￿rst time satisfying the reporting
requirements (the ￿rm existed last year but has not been reported). The ￿rst two options are
the new entrants. Further details on the reporting requirements and German FDI dataset can













Figure 1: Number of new investments
Table (2) shows that 63 percent of new entries take place in Europe. The
geography of the new entrants reveals that the USA receives the largest share of
the number of new entries (10.6 percent). Although 67.1 percent of entries in the
USA are M&A investments, the USA has the second largest share of worldwide
Green￿eld entries (11.1 percent). China is the largest receiver of Green￿eld
investments with a share of about 15.9 percent of the total German Green￿eld
entries worldwide. Furthermore, table (2) shows the regional pattern of FDI
destinations. Several countries that share a common border with Germany such
as Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Poland are among the top 10
recipients of new FDI projects. This indicates to the widely recognised border
e⁄ect and speaks for the inclusion of a variable measuring the distance between
Germany and the ￿nal destination of the FDI project.
In terms of the size of the new investment, ￿gure (2) shows that the average
￿xed and intangible assets of a FDI project varies across the modes of entry
and locations. For example, in 2007 the average asset ratio of a M&A project
allocated out of Europe amounts to over 60 million Euro whereas this average
for a M&A project within Europe is about 23 million Euro.
Table (3) provides the means, standard deviations, 5th percentiles, and 95th
percentiles of the variables that are used in our study according to both types
of FDI. The ￿gures are similar across both modes of investments. We report
the coe¢ cients of correlation between the variables in table (4). The statutory
8Table 2: German outbound new FDI entries, 2005-2007 (percent)
Share in MA share MA share Green￿eld share
total new in new in worldwide in worldwide
entry entrants MA entrants Green￿eld entrants
Europe 63 73 66.9 54.4
Out of Europe 37 61.4 33.1 45.6
Austria 5.4 71.0 5.6 5.0
Belgium 2.5 84.0 3.1 1.3
China 7.9 36.8 4.2 15.9
France 6.4 83.3 7.8 3.4
Italy 3.6 83.0 4.3 1.9
Poland 3.5 59.2 2.9 4.5
Russia 2.3 38.2 1.3 4.5
Switzerland 4.2 77.6 4.7 3.0
The Netherlands 4.8 76.5 5.4 3.6
UK 8.7 86.1 10.9 3.8
USA 10.6 67.1 10.4 11.1
Note: The reported ￿gures are shares in the total number of entries. The






















non-Europe Greenfield non-Europe M&A Europe Greenfield Europe M&A
Figure 2: Average ￿xed and intangible assets
9tax rate is highly positively correlated with the e⁄ective average tax rate (0.94).
The correlation between the corruption level and the statutory tax rate is very
low.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
mean sd. 5th Percentile 95th percentile
statutory tax rate 0.27 0.06 0.16 0.37
no. a¢ liates 0.16 0.42 0 1.09
total assets 1.31 3.21 0 9.59
gdp capita 9.85 0.76 8.31 10.76
population 16.91 1.62 14.51 19.51
openess 1.05 0.82 0.3 3.02
distance 7.86 1.19 6.14 9.41
labour freedom 0.65 0.16 0.4 0.95
corruption -5.77 2.37 -2.40 -9.39
market capitalisation 0.96 0.81 0.27 2.10
RD / GDP 1.31 0.92 0.11 3.43
market potential 28.86 0.64 27.40 30.13
e⁄ective tax rate 0.27 0.08 0.16 0.42
Note: The reader is referred to the data appendix for













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table (5) presents our main estimation results. The signs of the estimated
coe¢ cients on country-speci￿c variables provide the directions of the e⁄ects of
these variables on the odds ratio of the probability of choosing a location l. In
columns (1) to (3) we constrain the e⁄ects of taxation to be the same across
modes of FDI. The di⁄erence between column (1) and (2) is the inclusion of
year dummies in column (2). To capture potential industry-speci￿c location
preferences, we re-estimate the benchmark model but include industry-speci￿c
dummies. The results are reported in column (3). As expected, the coe¢ cient
on the tax rate is negative and signi￿cant in all speci￿cations. This ￿nding is
in line with studies that consider a similar exercise on the location decision of
a¢ liates abroad; Buettner and Ruf (2007) and Egger et al. (2009). Also, this
￿nding is in line with results obtained from aggregate FDI ￿ ow ￿gures; a recent
example is Djankov et al. (2009).
However, such speci￿cations ignore the heterogeneous modes of investment.
In the remaining speci￿cations in table (5), we allow taxation to have di⁄erent
impacts depending on the mode of investment. In columns (4) to (6) in ta-
ble (5), the estimated coe¢ cients on the tax rate indicate a negative response
of Green￿eld investments (the reference group) to high taxes. The coe¢ cients
in non-linear models are not equivalent to elasticities. Marginal e⁄ects in non-
linear models are conditional on all independent variables included on the model.
We compute the corresponding elasticities and report the results in table (6).
The estimated elasticities are very similar across speci￿cations within a sam-
ple. Therefore, we report the results for one speci￿cation per sample, namely
elasticities corresponding to the speci￿cation including year-dummies but not
industry-dummies. For example, as indicated in column (3) of table (6), we ￿nd
that an increase in the statutory corporate income tax rate of 10 percent (for
instance from 35% to 38.5%) reduces the probability of choosing a country to
host a Green￿eld investment by 6.4 percent.
Yet, the elasticity of the interaction term ￿ ￿M&A reported in column (2) of
table (6) is positive and signi￿cant (0.30), but cannot be necessarily interpreted
as a clear indication that M&A investments react less sensitively to international
di⁄erences in taxation than Green￿eld investments do. As stressed in Ai and
Norton (2003), the interpretation of the estimated elasticity of the interaction
term in non-linear models is not straightforward. To disentangle the estimated
tax impact on M&A investments, the full interaction e⁄ect should be computed.
The full interaction e⁄ect is a function of the cross-partial derivative of the
expected value of the dependent variable. Hence, its statistical signi￿cance
depends on the signi￿cance of the whole cross-derivative, and cannot be tested
with the usual t-test on the interaction term.
To be sure, we compute the full interaction e⁄ect as a function of the pre-
dicted probability and the corresponding z-statistics. Figure (3) plots the re-
sults. The interaction e⁄ects are positive and signi￿cant for almost all observa-
tions con￿rming the hypothesis that Green￿eld investments react more strongly
to high tax rates than M&A investments. The interaction e⁄ects are insigni￿-
12cant for few observations in the left group of ￿rms whose predicted probability
is rather small (on the left of the lower panel of ￿gure 3). In line with the
estimated positive interaction e⁄ects, column (4) of table (6) shows that the
estimated tax elasticity of M&A investments is 0.36; i.e. only about half of the
tax elasticity of Green￿eld investments (0.64 in column 3).
Additionally, in the remaining speci￿cations in table (5) we investigate whether
or not the control variables may have di⁄erent in￿ uences on the location prob-
ability depending on the mode of entry. We concentrate the analysis on either
the sample of Green￿eld investments (columns 7 to 9) or the sample of M&A
projects (columns 10 to 12). The corresponding elasticities are reported in table
(6) in columns (3) and (4), respectively. According to the results, an increase in
the corporate income tax rate of a 10 percent reduces the probability of choosing
a country to host a Green￿eld investment by about 6.4 percent. For the M&A
sample, the coe¢ cient on the tax rate although signi￿cant is rather small. For
instance, an increase in the statutory corporate income tax rate of 10 percent
reduces the probability of a country receiving a M&A investment by 3.6 per-
cent. The negative M&A tax elasticity is consistent with recent studies that use
aggregate ￿gures on M&A; Di Giovanni (2005) and Coeurdacier et al. (2009).
Thus, our results suggest that M&A investments are less discouraged to locate
their a¢ liates in high tax economies than Green￿eld investments do.
Concerning the remaining control variables, based on the results reported in
table (5) and the elasticities reported in table (6), the presence of a¢ liated ￿rms
and their previous year total ￿xed investment in assets in a location increase
the probability of entering this location again in all speci￿cations. Additionally,
the size (population) and the level of development of the host economy (gdp per
capita) both have positive signi￿cant e⁄ects on the odds ratio of the location
probability. Distance has a negative e⁄ect as expected.9 The openness of the
economy to international trade is a positive determinant of the location prob-
ability of FDI in the whole sample. However, the sub-sampling indicates that
the openness variable seems to play particularly a signi￿cant role in the location
decision of Green￿eld investments. Although the labour freedom index has the
expected positive sign in all speci￿cations it is insigni￿cant.10 Further, as in
Javorcik and Wei (2009) we ￿nd that a decrease in the level of corruption, as
captured by the Transparency International index, increases the probability of
selecting a location for an a¢ liate. However, this index loses its signi￿cance in
the Green￿eld sample (columns 7 to 9). This may indicate that di⁄erent modes
of investment may accept di⁄erent conditions in the host economy.
9Hijzen et al. (2008) examine in details the role of trade costs for M&A activities.
10Dewit et al. (2009) ￿nd based on aggregate ￿gures that the level of employment protection
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14Table 6: Estimated elasticities
Elasticity Full Full Green￿eld M&A
sample sample Sample Sample
￿ -0.47a -0.83a -0.64a -0.36b
(.12) (.13) (.32) (.15)
￿ ￿ M&A 0.30a
(.02)
no: affiliates 0.06a 0.06a 0.03b 0.10a
(.00) (.00) (.01) (.01)
total assets 0.35a 0.36a 0.39a 0.32a
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
gdp capita 6.41a 6.49a 7.41a 6.14a
(.50) (.50) (.86) (.65)
population 11.95a 12.05a 14.24a 10.48a
(.51) (.51) (.97) (.60)
openness 0.26a 0.27a 0.54a 0.03
(.03) (.03) (.06) (.05)
distance -2.94a -2.89a -2.30a -3.32a
(.17) (.17) (.26) (.23)
labour freedom 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.051
(.10) (.10) (.18) (.13)
corruption -0.29a -0.28a -0.10 -0.45a
(.08) (.08) (.13) (.10)
Note: Note: a, b, and c indicate signi￿cance at the level of 1, 5 and 10%
respectively. Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses.
The reported elasticities correspond to the models in columns
(2), (5), (8) and (11) in table (5).
15Figure 3: Interaction e⁄ect as a function of predicted probability
164 Robustness analysis
In this section, we extend our analysis to consider various potential issues in
connection to the robustness of the main results. For example, high income
economies may contain more attractive targets for acquisition than lower in-
come economies. To address this issue, we split the sample into OECD and
non-OECD countries, and examine the e⁄ects of the corporate tax rate in both
sub-samples. Columns (1) and (2) of table (7) present the results. The esti-
mated coe¢ cients on the tax rate in both sub-samples are as expected negative
while the coe¢ cients on the interaction term ￿￿M&A are positive. This ￿nding
con￿rms our main results presented in the previous section. The lower sensitiv-
ity of the location decision of M&A investments to di⁄erences in the tax rate
is robust to the distinction between OECD and non-OECD countries. The es-
timated coe¢ cient on corruption in the non-OECD sample is negative and its
magnitude becomes larger in comparison to the results obtained from the full
sample (table 5). This indicates that a high level of corruption, particularly in
non-OECD host economies, reduces the likelihood of locating a new a¢ liate.
One additional question is in relation to the size of the investment. Is the
e⁄ect of the tax rate on the decision to locate a small investment di⁄erent from
the e⁄ect on the decision to locate a large investment? Based on the median of
total ￿xed and intangible assets of the new foreign investment, we distinguish
between large and small a¢ liates. Columns (3) and (4) of table (7) display the
estimation results obtained from both sub-samples. The results do not suggest
systematic di⁄erences between the responses of the location choice of large and
small a¢ liates to corporate taxation.
As one could argue that large plant expansion is of a similar margin of in-
vestment as a Green￿eld project, it is also of interest to account for potential
e⁄ects of corporate taxation on the decision on plant expansion. We exploit in-
formation on the balance sheets of German a¢ liates abroad in order to broaden
the de￿nition of Green￿eld investments in our analysis. Particularly, in addi-
tion to new Green￿eld entrants, we consider a plant expansion measured as an
increase in the total balance sheet of an already existing FDI a¢ liate of more
than 50 percent as a Green￿eld investment. The results based upon this broad
de￿nition of Green￿eld investments are reported in column (5). The added
Green￿eld projects to the sample do not alter the tax e⁄ect.
In columns (6) to (9) of table (7), we control for further country charac-
teristics. We include in column (6) the ratio of market capitalisation of listed
companies to GDP to capture available potential targets for acquisition. Re-
lated to the issue of available targets, R&D considerations may trigger M&A
activities. If high tax economies are those economies associated with high ratios
of R&D expenditure to GDP, then the e⁄ect of the tax rate may to some extent
capture R&D opportunities. We address such a possibility by adding the R&D
intensity in the host economy to the set of controls. The results reported in
column (7) show that the tax e⁄ect is robust to the inclusion of R&D intensity.
In addition, one aspect that might derive the location decision of multinational
￿rms is market opportunities not only in the host economy but also in the region.
17We construct a proxy for the regional market potential as the sum of the GDP
of the countries that are located in the same geographical region. We de￿ne
geographical regions based on the United Nations statistical classi￿cation. This
market potential proxy is estimated to have a positive sign in column (8), but
losses its signi￿cance when we also include the market capitalisation measure
and the R&D intensity (column 9).
While various studies ￿nd that the statutory corporate income tax rate has
a high signi￿cant predictive power for the location decision, as for example in
Buettner and Ruf (2007), for further insight we examine also the impact of the
e⁄ective tax rate on the location decision. Unfortunately, data on the e⁄ective
tax rate are available only for 32 countries (mainly OECD countries). According
to our ￿ndings in column (10), the impacts of taxation on the location decision
of FDI ￿rms are very similar for both tax rate measures.
Hence, the results of the various speci￿cations presented in this section are
reassuring that the e⁄ect of corporate taxation on the location decision is sig-
ni￿cantly higher for Green￿eld investments than for M&A investments.
5 Conclusion
The empirical ￿ndings reported here contribute to our understanding of the
role of taxation in determining the investment location decision by setting out
reasons and providing empirical evidence why taxes matter. While most exist-
ing studies treat FDI as homogenous projects, our results distinguish between
the compositions of FDI: M&A versus Green￿eld investments. We ￿nd that an
increase in the statutory corporate income tax rate of 10 percent reduces the
probability of choosing a country to host a Green￿eld investment by about 6.4
percent. M&A investments however are less sensitive to di⁄erences in interna-
tional tax rates as indicated by a tax elasticity of -3.6 percent. This is consistent
with a (partial) capitalisation of taxes in the acquisition price. Our ￿ndings are
robust to a set of various speci￿cations. Since in the period of our sample all
FDI returns are exempted from German taxation, we could not test the e⁄ects
of the home country tax system. With regard to policy implications, our ￿nding
indicates that tax reforms a⁄ect the composition of FDI as tax policies seem
to di⁄erently a⁄ect the decision of M&A and Green￿eld projects. This ￿nding
also contributes to a growing literature on possible di⁄erential implications of
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Variable De￿nition Source
y a dummy that takes the value 1 for the chosen host Deutsche Bundesbank
economy and the value zero otherwise
￿ the statutory corporate income tax rate Mintz and Weichenrieder
(forthcoming)
M&A a dummy that takes the value 1 if the investment Deutsche Bundesbank
takes the form of M&A and zero if the investment
is a Green￿eld project
no: affiliates the logarithm of the number of a¢ liates already Deutsche Bundesbank
operating in the host economy
total assets the logarithm of total ￿xed and intangible assets Deutsche Bundesbank
invested by the parent ￿rm in location l
gdp capita the logarithm of gross domestic product per capita IFS of the IMF
based on PPP of the host economy
population the logarithm of the total number of inhabitants IFS of the IMF
in the host economy
openness the ratio of total trade (total imports plus total exports) IFS of the IMF
of the host economy to gross domestic product of the
host economy in current prices
distance the logarithm of the distance between Germany CEPII
(Hamburg) and the host economy
labour freedom the logarithm of the labour freedom component of the Heritage Foundation
Heritage index of economic freedom
corruption the Corruption Perception Index, rede￿ned such that Transparency
a high value of this index indicates a high level of International
corruption
market capitalisation ratio of market capitalisation of listed companies WDI of the WB
to gdp
R&D=GDP the ratio of government expenditure on research UNESCO Statistics
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effective tax the e⁄ective average corporate income tax rate Devereux et al.
(forthcoming)
market potential the logarithm of the sum of GDP of countries that IFS of the IMF and
are located in the same region. Geographical regions UN statistics
are de￿ned based on the United Nations statistical
database available from:
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#ftna
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